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ARTICLE
RATIONALES FOR RURAL LAND
REDISTRIBUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Lauren G. Robinson*
We, the people of South Africa, [r]ecognize the injustices of
our past... and [b]elieve that South Africa belongs to all
who live in it, united in our diversity.
We, therefore.., adopt this Constitution... to [hleal the
divisions of the past and establish a society based on demo-
cratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights... [and] [ilmprove the quality of life of all citizens
and free the potential of each person.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A critical mass, if not a preponderance of the Black majori-
ty, and those who were in the forefront of the struggle to end
White minority rule in South Africa, believe that some land
must be redistributed to the disenfranchised African majority
as an element of true political and economic transformation in
South Africa.2 The deprivation of the property rights of Afri-
* Associate, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Illinois; A.B. 1986, Vassar
College; J.D. 1994, New York University School of Law; M.P.A. 1994, New York
University Graduate School of Public Service. The ideas presented in this article
are my own. My thanks to Howard P. Venable for his comments and insights on
earlier drafts of this article, F. Michael Higginbotham for supporting my efforts to
publish this article and Cheryl I. Harris for comments and insights on this topic.
1. S. AFR. CONST. preamble.
2. See, e.g., AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, READY TO GOVERN, ANC POLICY
GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 26-30 (1992) [hereinafter ANC]; PAN
AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC) OF AZANIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LAND POLICY OF THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA
7-18 (1992) [hereinafter PAC]; ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW
SOUTH AFRICA 105-15 (1990); ESSY M. LETSOALO, LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA,
A BLACK PERSPECTIVE, preface (1987).
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cans,' the majority of the country's population, was the foun-
dation on which apartheid was built. Under apartheid, Afri-
cans endured profound and extensive economic hardship. Many
Africans still live in the rural homelands4 which are generally
extremely impoverished. In the name of apartheid, approxi-
mately 3.5 million Africans were forcibly removed from their
communities to the homelands between 1960-1983. Generally,
the homelands lacked economic viability and were never de-
signed to sustain the population placed on them.
Europeans dispossessed 6 Africans of their land through a
complex and lengthy process of conquest, the undermining of
chiefdoms, the enactment of statutes, and the implementation
of apartheid.7 These deliberate policies displaced Africans from
3. The writer uses the term "African" or "Black" to refer to people of African
descent whose forebears were farmers who originally populated the eastern regions
of South Africa and spoke any of the ethnic African languages. See LEONARD
THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 16 (1990). The writer uses the term
"White" to refer to people of European descent. As explained in detail herein, a
complex system of racial classifications was created by statute under apartheid.
This article analyzes the land-based oppression of Africans under apartheid. Other
racial groups, namely, Coloureds and Indians, also endured discrimination under
apartheid. This article focuses on the oppression of Africans because they were the
group most discriminated against under apartheid.
4. The homelands refer to the ten areas in South Africa designated by the
White minority-ruled government during apartheid for the habitation of Africans.
The areas were comprised of the reserves established in 1913 by statute and ex-
panded in 1936 also by statute. These areas have been known at various times as
the reserves, scheduled areas, released areas, and the homelands. The apartheid
government began referring to the areas as the homelands asserting that these
areas represented the original homelands of African ethnic groups. Africans deri-
sively refer to the areas as "bantustans" implying their dissatisfaction with the
apartheid government's exploitation of the tribal system. The homelands system
was abolished under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. See S. AFR.
CONST. ch. 2, § 21(3).
5. See LAURINE PLATzKY & CHERRYL WALKER, THE SURPLUS PEOPLE, FORCED
REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 9 (1985). This figure underestimates the total number
of forced removals because the government continued the policy after 1983.
6. The writer uses the term 'dispossession' to denote the European settlers'
and the White minority-ruled government's appropriation of land owned by Afri-
cans, the divestiture of full property rights to Africans by statute (e.g., the right to
own land directly or sell property freely) and the forced removals of Africans. The
writer considers the denial of full property rights dispossession because it divested
Africans of the opportunity to purchase property without restriction and accrue the
socioeconomic benefits that accompany property ownership. Although Africans had
been driven off of some of the land by colonial conquest prior to the Natives Land
Act of 1913 (1913 Act) and the Natives Land and Trust Act of 1936 (1936 Act),
those Acts precluded Africans from reversing those trends and changing the status
quo of land allocation. See discussion infra Part fl.C.
7. Discriminatory laws such as the 1913 Act and the 1936 Act, "resulted in
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the land and unleashed severe poverty on the majority of rural
Africans.8 Landless, Africans were coerced into a system of
cheap migrant labor that was needed to develop the mining
and manufacturing industries emerging at the turn of the
twentieth century.' Africans were similarly exploited and paid
subsistence wages by rural farmers who depended on their
labor.'0 .
Rural land should be redistributed to redress the harms
created by the particularly egregious statutes and policies of
the White minority-ruled government." The White minority-
ruled government enacted laws and acted through forinal legal
institutions to implement and perpetrate injustice and to lend
segregation and apartheid an air of legitimacy that they
lacked.'2 Segregation and apartheid formed the basis of the
systematic denial of fundamental rights to the majority of
South Africa's people through a political process in which the
majority was denied participation. 3
This article examines various rationales supporting rural
land redistribution in South Africa. Land redistribution, as
discussed in this article, embodies redistributing specific plots
of land to individuals and communities who possess legitimate
claims to that particular property; redistributing land as a
form of reparations to individuals without specific claims to
particular land but who have endured various harms emanat-
ing from land dispossession; and increasing the opportunities
for Africans to obtain land.
The article argues that the post-apartheid government
must redistribute rural land to Africans to redress the harms
that Africans have endured under apartheid and to enable
the allocation of eighty-seven percent of. . . [South Africa'sI best land to the
whites who were less than eighteen percent of the country's population." Zola
Skweyiya, Towards a Solution to the Land Question in Post-Apartheid South Afri-
ca: Problems and Models, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1989). For fur-
ther analysis of these acts see infra Part II.C.
8. See generally Skweyiya, supra note 7, at 213-15.
9. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 166-67.
10. See id. at 164-65.
11. The writer uses the term "White minority-ruled governmentP or "apartheid
government;" to refer to the government before the dismantling of apartheid. The
writer uses the term "democratically elected government" or "post-apartheid gov-
ernment" to refer to the government elected following the dismantling of apartheid.
12. Cf. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 190-91.
13. See generally id. at 189-91.
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them to achieve economic and social self-sufficiency. It also
explores the reasons why land is an appropriate remedy for the
harms committed in the name of apartheid.
Part II discusses the history of European conquest, the
evolution of apartheid, and the final stages of the transition to
South Africa's current regime. Part III analyzes rationales
supporting rural land redistribution. Part IV addresses various
issues raised by the implementation of comprehensive rural
land redistribution in South Africa. Part V examines the adju-
dication of individual claims to land. Finally, Part VI concludes
this article by arguing that, although implementing a compre-
hensive land reform program presents some formidable chal-
lenges, land reform is essential to the creation of the just and
unified South Africa envisioned by the country's Constitution.
II. A HISTORY OF DISPOSSESSION
The history of South Africa is marked by a series of inci-
dents in which European settlers dispossessed indigenous
South Africans of their land. The process of dispossession was
neither immediate nor monolithic. Dutch settlers began this
process in the mid-1600s when they invaded the Cape, the
territory of the Khoikhoi and the San.'4 Between the 1770s
and the late 1800s, African chiefdoms and Afrikaner farmers
and British colonists struggled over land and fought several
wars as Europeans settled further inland."5 European settlers
dispossessed Africans of much of their land by the twentieth
century. 6 Beginning in the early twentieth century, legisla-
tion segregated land ownership by race.'7 This was succeeded
by a more extensive series of statutes, which preceded the
implementation of apartheid in the late 1940s. 8
A. The Indigenous People of the Western Cape and Initial
European Contact
The indigenous people of the Western Cape were the
14. See id& at 37-38; see also I THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOuTH AFRICA 40-41
(Monica Wilson & Leonard Thompson eds. 1969) [hereinafter OXFORD HISTORY].
15. See generally THOIPSON, supra note 3, at 70-109.
16. See generally id.
17. See id. at 163.
18. See id. at 189-90.
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Khoikhoi, a community of cattle-keepers, and the San, who
were hunter-gatherers. 9 In 1652, Jan van Riebeeck of the
Dutch East India Company (the Company) settled the Cape of
Good Hope on the western coast of South Africa." He estab-
lished a resting stop for Dutch ships en route from the Nether-
lands to southeast Asia."' The Dutch settled further inward
as they moved from crop farming to cattle farming and as
slavery developed.' In addition to enslaving the Khoikhoi, the
Dutch held slaves from Madagascar, Indonesia, and India.'
The Dutch were dependent on the slaves to make their econo-
my work. This economic relationship was to repeat itself in
the late 1800s and throughout the twentieth century as politi-
cally empowered Whites relied on the labor of politically
disempowered Africans.'
The availability of land in the Cape attracted Dutch set-
tlers who were granted "burgher's rights" by the Company.26
These "burgher's rights" gave settlers large tracts of land to
produce food for the Company at fixed prices.2 The Company
also gave rights to land, generally, six-thousand acre farms, to
"trekboers" for a nominal fee.28
In the 1670s, the Khoikhoi attempted to limit Dutch en-
croachmentY.2 By the mid-1700s, the Dutch, possessing superi-
or weapons, defeated the Khoikhoi after several wars." A
smallpox epidemic also decimated most of the Khoikhoi.3'
The British captured the Cape from the Dutch in 1795.2
Although the Dutch regained the territory in 1803, it was lost
to the British in 1806 who retained control through 1910.
3
The British government provided official support and easy
19. See OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 14, at 40-41.
20. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 32.
21. See id. at 32-33.
22. See id. at 33-37.
23. See id. at 36.
24. See id.
25. See generally id. at 118-19.
26. See id. at 35.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 46. Trekboers were semi-migrant farmers. See id.
29. See id. at 38.
30. See id. at 38-39.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 51.
33. See id. at 52, 154.
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access to capital to its settlers who "began to pour into the
area" and "gradually edged the remaining Khoikhoi people out
of their landholdings."'
B. The Invasion of African Chiefdoms and the Development of
the Capitalist Industrial Sector
Between the late 1770s and the mid-1800s, White colonists
settled into the eastern regions of South Africa where they
first encountered groups of Africans who spoke different dia-
lects of the Bantu language (Bantu-speakers)." Among the
Bantu-speakers were the Nguni, Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, and
Pedi."6 These indigenous Black South Africans, as distin-
guished from the Khoikhoi, were agriculturalists and cattle
keepers who lived in large scale tribal societies known as
chiefdoms."T
Initially, some of the Bantu-speaker chiefs welcomed the
settlers, believing that they would comply with the customs of
the chiefdoms. 8 The chiefdoms began resisting invading Eu-
ropeans when the settlers threatened their autonomy.39 Dif-
ferences between Europeans and African tribes also erupted
because of distinct perceptions of land tenure.4" For example,
White settlers would claim that a chief had granted them
land.41 Since African chiefs did not "own" land in the Europe-
an sense, they could not convey it.4 The notion of exclusive
rights by individuals over collectively owned land did not exist
in African culture.4" For example, the Xhosa believed that
every man had the right to use land just as he had the right to
breathe the air."
European settlers fought several wars against several
African chiefdoms over a hundred year period. For example,
the Xhosa and White settlers clashed several times in the
34. Id. at 62-63.
35. See id. at 10, 16, 70.
36. See id. at 16.
37. See id. at 10, 21-28.
38. See id. at 70-71.
39. See id. at 71.
40. See OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 14, at 268.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 268-69.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 268.
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1800s and the Zulu fought the Dutch and the English in
1879.4" The Europeans gained hegemony with their superior
weapons despite being outnumbered by Africans.46 Further,
the Dutch and English united to defeat some African
chiefdoms.' African chiefdoms, not having identified the con-
cept of racialism, did not unite to defend themselves against
invading Europeans.48 By the end of the nineteenth century,
African chiefdoms were subjected to White control.49
The influx of White settlers into South Africa increased
significantly with the discovery of diamonds and gold in the
late 1800s." The development of the diamond and gold min-
ing industries strengthened White economic power and the de-
mand *for African labor.51 These discoveries triggered the pro-
cess of absorbing Black labor into a White-dominated, capi-
talist structure.2
British domination of South Africa, including the
Afrikaner 3 republics, increased through 1 9 1 0 .' The British
defeated the Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) and
annexed their territories, but granted self-government to the
population on the basis of a primarily White franchise.55 The
Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, combining the Brit-
ish colonies in South Africa into a single state."
45. See id. at 252; see also THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 124.
46. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 123.
47. See id. at 122.
48. See generally id. at 122-32.
49. See id. at 122, 163.
50. See Bently J. Anderson, The Restoration of the South African Citizenship
Act: An Exercise in Statutory Obfuscation, 9 CONN. J. INTL L. 295, 296-97 (1994).
51. See id. at 296-99.
52. See id.
53. The term "Afrikaner" refers to the white settlers who arrived in South
Africa under the sponsorship of the Dutch East India Company. See Ibrahim J.
Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: the United
Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT1 L.J. 1464, 1467 n.7 (1996).
These settlers are generally of Dutch, German, and French descent. See id.
54. See Frank Berman, South Africa: A Study of Apartheid and Its Enforce-
ment, 2 TOTJRO J. TRANSNATL L. 1, 15 (1991).
55. See generally id. at 12-14.
56. See id. at 15.
1997] 471
BROOK. J. INTL L.
C. Laying the Foundation of the Apartheid State: Legislating
Racially Discriminatory Land Policies
In the early twentieth century, the White-ruled govern-
ment began legislating policies that significantly restricted
Africans' land rights and drove them further from their
land." The denial of property rights to Africans was the foun-
dation on which apartheid and African political and economic
subjugation was built.8 Parliament enacted laws that created
market and territorial segregation, dispossessed Blacks of
property and property rights, and restricted Blacks' contractual
rights.59 Although Blacks had already been pushed off much
of the land by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Na-
tives Land Act of 191360 (1913 Act) and the Natives Land and
Trust Act of 193661 (1936 Act) prohibited Blacks from pur-
chasing most of the country's land and did not provide suffi-
cient land in the reserves for Blacks to sustain viable rural
communities.62 Further, these statutes terminated the exis-
tence of a neutral marketplace in which Africans could fairly
participate and created a cheap pool of African labor for the
rural and urban sector.'
1. 1913 Natives Land Act
The first major statute that set the stage for apartheid and
territorial segregation of the races was the 1913 Act, which
effectively denied the majority of the population fee simple and
leasehold rights to the majority of the land.' The 1913 Act
set aside seven percent of the surface area of South Africa as
reserves or scheduled areas as territories where only Blacks,
who comprised more than seventy-five percent of the popula-
tion, could purchase property.' The statute also prohibited
57. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 163.
58. See South Africa Grapples With Land Issue, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 11, 1991, at
1-2.
59. See generally SACHS, supra note 2, at 106-07, 114.
60. Black Land Act 27 of 1913 (repealed 1991).
61. Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (repealed 1991).
62. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 163-64.
63. Cf. id. at 163-66.
64. See White Paper on Land Reform 14 (Mar. 1991) (on file with author)
[hereinafter White Paper on Land Reform]; see also Skweyiya, supra note 7, at
213.
65. See Black Land Act 27 of 1913, § 1.(2) (repealed 1991); see also Skweyiya,
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land transactions between "Black[s]" and "person[s] other than
Blacks" in the areas outside of the reserves.6 The prohibited
transactions included sharecropping and squatting. 7 Under
sharecropping or "farming-on-the-halves" arrangements, White
farm owners would provide the seed to Africans, who would
work and live on the farms." The parties then divided the
crop between themselves in various proportions.69 These ar-
rangements were eliminated under the 1913 Act largely be-
cause they gave Africans the opportunity to earn relatively
high incomes.0
The impact of the 1913 Act was devastating:
It is possible that no other legislation has so deeply affected
the lives of black people in South Africa as the Natives' Land
Act of 1913. It created overnight a floating landless proletari-
at whose labour could be used and manipulated at will, and
ensured that ownership of the land had finally and securely
passed into the hands of the ruling white race. 1
Further, "[aiwaking on Friday morning June 20, 1913, the
South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a
pariah in the land of his birth. 2
The 1913 Act maintained the status quo by halting the
existing allocation of land ownership between the races.
This devastated Africans by giving White farm owners tremen-
dous bargaining power. Africans seeking to expand their lands,
on the other hand, had little bargaining power when dealing
with White farmers whose land was declared to be in the re-
serves because of the scarcity of available land after the 1913
supra note 7, at 213.
66. See Black Land Act 27 of 1913, § 1.(1) (repealed 1991).
67. See COLIN BUNDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEASANTRY
213 (2d ed. 1988). White farmers, however, in parts of the Eastern Cape, the
Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, continued to enter into these arrangements
with Africans into the 1940s. See id. at 231; see also MERLE LIPrON, CAPITALISM
AND APARTHEID 89 (1985).
68. See BUNDY, supra note 67, at 213.; Cf TIM KEEGAN, FACING THE STORM,
PORTRAITS OF BLACK IN RURAL SOUTH AFRICA 23 (1988).
69. Cf KEEGAN, supra note 68, at 23.
70. See BUNDY, supra note 67, at 213, 230.
71. Bessie Head, Foreward to SOL. T. PLAATJE, NATIVE LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA
ix (1982).
72. PLAATJE, supra note 71, at 21.
73. See Black Land Act 21 of 1913, § 1.(1)-(2) (repealed 1991).
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Act.74 They had little choice but to accept the terms offered
which were often egregious. Some Europeans who owned land
along the riverfront or other prime land refused to sell land to
Africans."5
Africans, who generally did not have a great deal of mon-
ey, were also forced to pay exorbitant prices for land because
the 1913 Act significantly decreased the supply of land avail-
able to Africans for purchase. This, in turn, artificially in-
creased the price of land.7 Africans who sold their land had
limited opportunities to buy other land.
Finally, the 1913 Act played a decisive role in the emer-
gence of a White-dominated capitalist agricultural sector at the
expense of the Black peasantry. It initiated a process that
ultimately impoverished most Black farmers by changing the
status of self-sufficient African farmer-landowners, rent-paying
squatters, and sharecroppers to farm laborers forced to sell
their labor to White-owned farms at low wages. Africans
who left the farms for slightly higher paying jobs in the urban
areas were forced into the harsh system of migrant labor in
the mining and manufacturing industries."
African labor was needed for South Africa to evolve as a
capitalist society.8 ' Although Africans were an integral and
necessary part of the growing urban industrial sector, they
were unable to share in the wealth that their labor created.8 2
Africans were not paid a living wage, endured poor working
conditions, and were precluded from certain jobs which were
reserved for Whites.' The migrant labor system was particu-
larly harsh because it separated families by forcing rural
dwellers, primarily men, to live apart from their families and
74. See Howard Venable, "Native Land" Laws, Segregated Markets and the
Economic Decline of African Landowning Communities, in the Western Transvaal,
1900-1940, at 77-78 (1993) (unpublished paper, on file with Brooklyn Journal of
International Law).
75. See id. at 107.
76. See id. at 85-86.
77. See id.
78. See generally BUNDY, supra note 67, at 230.
79. See id. at 231.
80. See generally THOAPSON, supra note 3, at 165-69.
81. See generally BUNDY, supra note 67, at 213-15, 230-36.
82. See generally id.
83. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 165-68; see also LIPTON, supra note 67, at
18-20.
474 [Vol. XXII:2
RURAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION
travel to distant cities to obtain work.'
2. 1936 Native Land and Trust Act
Parliament amended the 1913 Act with the 1936 Act."
The 1936 Act slightly augmented the reserves with additional
land (the "released areas")." This increased the land available
for Black ownership to 13.6% of the country's surface area.7
The 1936 Act, however, further dispossessed Africans by deny-
ing them direct ownership of land in the reserves.88 The stat-
ute substituted individual land ownership with trust tenure by
establishing the South African Development Trust,89 a gov-
ernment body which purchased land in the released areas for
"Black settlement.' °
During this period, Parliament also passed legislation that
severely restricted the rights and movement of Blacks and
created racially segregated sections in the urban areas.9'
Among this legislation was the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consoli-
dation Act of 194592 (Urban Areas Act), which restricted the
rights of Blacks to acquire land in urban areas and allowed the
government to remove "redundant Blacks" from urban areas
that were "in excess of the reasonable labor requirements in
[those areas]."93 This law, and others like it, essentially
barred Africans from the urban areas, which became known as
"White" South Africa," when they were not working. 5 A
group of statutes known as the pass laws, for example, con-
84. Cf LIPTON, supra note 67, at 18.
85. See Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, ch. I, § 1 (repealed
1991).
86. Id. sch. 1; see also White Paper on Land Reform, supra note 64, at 14.
87. See White Paper on Land Reform, supra note 64, at 15.
88. See Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, ch. II, § 6 (repealed
1991); see also generally THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 163-64.
89. See id. ch. IT, § 4.
90. See id. ch. III, § 10.(1).
91. See JOHN DUGARD, HUmAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRiCAN LEGAL ORDER
166 (1978); see also Skweyiya, supra note 7, at 215.
92. Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (repealed 1986).
93. id. §§ 6, 28.
94. White South Africans began to refer to the urban areas as "white-only ar-
eas" as early as 1922 following a statement in a 1922 Transvaal Local Govern-
ment Commission that the towns had been built by and for White people. P.D.
Glavovic, Traditional Rights to the Land and Wilderness in South Africa, 23 CASE
W. RES. J. INTIL. L. 281, n.1 (1991).
95. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 166.
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trolled the labor flow and the number of Africans entering
South Africa's urban areas."
D. Apartheid: 1948
In the aftermath of World War II and the fight for democ-
racy and at a time when African and Asian nations were fight-
ing against colonialism, South Africa's White minority-ruled
government further institutionalized and formalized its politi-
cal disenfranchisement of Black South Africans. In 1948, the
National Party rose to power by espousing apartheid to lower
income and middle class White South Africans.97 Once in pow-
er, the National Party subsidized White farmers in exchange
for their political loyalty." This practice continued until the
late 1980s when White farmers began defecting from the Na-
tional Party to the right-wing Conservative Party.9
Apartheid represented a culmination of South Africa's
segregationist policies as opposed to a break in its history. It
embodied the White minority-ruled government's initial articu-
lation of a rationale for its segregationist policies. Apartheid,
as distinct from de facto segregation, was unique because ra-
cial segregation was not simply socially condoned; it was legal-
ly mandated and it entrenched White privilege through the
law.100
In the 1940s, Hendrik Verwoerd, who would become Prime
Minister between 1958 and 1966, systematized the policy of
apartheid.'0 ' He justified apartheid on the basis of an ideol-
ogy of White supremacy and the alleged racial inferiority of
Africans.0 2 Under apartheid, the White minority-ruled gov-
ernment defined South Africa's citizens according to an elab-
orate system of racial classifications.0 3 Whites were all
96. See LIPTON, supra note 67, at 92; see also THOMPSON, supra note 3, at
166.
97. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 187-89.
98. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 188-89; see also LIPTON, supra note 67, at
86. These subsidies included providing white farmers with tax exemptions, price
supports, and low interest rate loans. See SEBASTIAN MALLABY, AFTER APARTHEID,
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA 148 (1992).
99. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 148.
100. See DUGARD, supra note 85, at 53.
101. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 189.
102. See DUGARD, supra note 91, at 22.
103. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 190.
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placed in the same racial group, while Blacks were broken up
into numerous sub-groups.' 4 The four major racial groups,
under the Population Registration Act of 195005 were White,
Coloured, Indian, and Blacks, who were further classified into
subgroups based on tribal affiliations.05
At the high point of apartheid, the government regulated
virtually all areas of life-social, culture, education, commerce,
politics, and residence-through a complex series of statutes to
maintain separation of the races.0 7 By the 1960s, the apart-
heid government modified its rationale for apartheid by assert-
ing that all races benefited by developing separately, because
segregation preserved ethnic integrity.0 8
E. Forced Removals and the Fallacy of the 'Independent
Homelands'
Between 1960 and 1983, an estimated 3.5 million Africans
were forcibly removed from non-Native areas by the govern-
ment and White farm owners.0 9 The apartheid government
forcibly removed Africans to entrench apartheid and imple-
ment the policy of separate development."0 This policy was
unconscionable as the reserves were inadequate to absorb the
vast African population and, as a result, Africans were subject-
ed to severe economic and social conditions."'
Under the policy of separate development, the apartheid
government transformed the reserves into the homelands to
achieve total racial segregation." Under separate develop-
ment, Africans were banished to the homelands and the urban
and industrial areas comprised "White" South Africa."' The
policy's ultimate goal was to deprive Africans of their South
African citizenship by enabling them to opt for independence in
104. See id.
105. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (repealed 1991).
106. See id. §§ 1, 5; see also Randal S. Jeffrey, Note, Social and Economic
Rights in the South African Constitution: Legal Consequences and Practical Consid-
erations, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 n.2 (1993).
107. See id.
108. See LIPTON, supra note 67, at 30-31.
109. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 9.
110. See id. at 16.
111. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 164.
112. See generally id. at 191-95.
113. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 16.
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the homelands." At a time when colonialism became unac-
ceptable in the international community, separate development
represented the White minority-ruled government's attempt to
defend its racist policies by pretending it had granted "inde-
pendence" to Black areas."5
The apartheid government installed the institutions for
government within the homelands under the Black Authorities
Act of 1951"16 by which tribal chiefs were granted limited au-
thority to govern within the homelands."7 Parliament supple-
mented this Act with the Promotion of Black Self-government
Act of 1959."8 This statute identified eight tribal groups
(North and South Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Venda, Xhosa, Zulu,
and Tswana; Ndebele was added subsequently), each of which
was forced to move into different designated homelands."'
The separate development policy was particularly offensive
because it attempted to make Africans foreigners in their own
country. Subsequent legislation was enacted that assigned all
Africans citizenship to one of the homelands and granted the
homelands the right to seek independence from South Afri-
ca." Prior to the dismantling of apartheid, approximately
eight million Africans were stripped of their South African
citizenship as a result of various homelands opting for inde-
pendence. 2' The apartheid government defended this policy
by analogizing the independence of the homelands to the decol-
onization occurring throughout Africa in the 1960s.' The
theory was that Parliament was liberating Blacks by enabling
them to exercise political rights in the homelands." The
homelands did not, in fact, represent true political representa-
114. See THOIPSON, supra note 3, at 191; see also PLATZKY & WALKER, supra
note 5, at 16.
115. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 222.
116. Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951.
117. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 111.
118. Promotion of Black Self-government Act 46 of 1959. The name of this act
was later changed to the Representation Between the Republic of South Africa and
Self-governing Territories Act. See Constitutional Laws Amendment Act 32 of 1987,
§ 10.
119. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 112-13. The homelands included
Lebowa, KwaNdebele, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, Gazankulu, and KwaZulu. See Promo-
tion of Black Self Government Act 46 of 1959, § 2(a)-(i).
120. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 191.
121. PLATKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 22.
122. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 191.
123. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 23.
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tion for Africans because the apartheid government installed
the chiefs.' Further, Parliament co-opted the tribal system
to advance its own purposes by conferring upon the chiefs
more power than they possessed traditionally.' Finally, the
homelands could not be independent when they were not eco-
nomically self-sufficient and were economically dependent on
"White" South Africa."
In connection with the implementation of separate devel-
opment, the Surplus People's Project estimates that the apart-
heid government and White farmers removed over 3.5 million
Africans from their homes between 1960 and 1983.1 7 Approx-
imately 614,000 Black landowners were removed from their
real property in "white areas," commonly referred to as "black
spots."' The removal of "black spots" was central to separate
development because their existence undermined the apartheid
government's assertion that the homelands were the true and
traditional homelands of Africans and proper sites for Africans
to exercise their political rights. 9 African landowners were
dispossessed of their property and did not receive equivalent
land.13 African landowners were only entitled to agricultural
land in the homeland to which they were relocated if they
owned more than 20 morgen (40.4 acres) of land previous-
ly.131 Otherwise, African landowners were entitled to only a
dwelling plot.' During the same period, White farm owners
evicted over one million Black tenants, thereby creating a
floating, landless proletariat with limited viable means of fend-
ing for themselves.' These removals violated norms of due
process because Africans were forced from their land without
any sort of hearings where challenges could be brought.14
124. See id. at 111.
125. See id.
126. Cf L TSOALO, supra note 2, at 57.
127. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 194.
128. See id. 193-94; see also PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 44. The
apartheid government referred to Black owned land outside of the reserves as
"black spots." See DUGARD, supra note 91, at 4.
129. See PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 115.
130. See id. at 93; see also LETSOALO, supra note 2, at 48.
131. See LETSOALO, supra note 2, at 48.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 49.
134. See id. at 48. While the apartheid government was required to consult the
tribal chiefs regarding removals, no notice was required to be given to the individ-
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Forced removals destroyed entire African communities:
Before, there was always something that kept the community
ticking over and operating correctly... there was the extend-
ed family, the granny and grandpa were at home, doing the
household chores and looking after the kids. Now, the family
is taken out of this environment where everything is safe and
known. It is put in a matchbox in a strange place. All social
norms have suddenly been abolished.135
This community destruction was exacerbated by the apartheid
government's categorizing Africans by ethnic group, regardless
of whether they felt an affiliation to that group, and the subse-
quent assignment of the members of each group to their re-
spective homelands.136 This "divide and conquer" process en-
trenched minority control even further.137
Forced removals unleashed severe economic and social
harm on Africans. Some of the homelands were never much
more than holding camps established to preclude Africans from
entering "White" South Africa but to keep Blacks available to
serve "White" South Africa's labor needs.3 ' Because the
homelands were not economically viable, Africans were coerced
into the harsh migrant labor system for subsistence wages.139
Africans who could not find employment, on the other hand,
struggled to survive as farmers in the face of the land shortage
that existed in the homelands. 140
The land allocated from the homelands was insufficient to
support full-time farming for the population placed on the
land.' Landlessness has only increased as the population in
uals who were being moved, and, in any event, the tribal chiefs had no authority
to reject or approve an approval order. id. 48-49.
135. Don Pinnock, Breaking the Web: Economic Consequences of the Destruc-
tion of Extended Families By Group Areas Relocations in Cape Town 14 (Apr. 13-
19, 1984) (unpublished paper, on file with Tufts University Library). For other
narratives of the devastation to families following forced removals see PLATKY &
WALKER, supra note 5, at 3-4.
136. See generally PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 5, at 112-13.
137. See id. at 23.
138. See LETSOALO, supra note 2, at 57-58.
139. See id. at 57.
140. See generally id. at 57-58.
141. See FRANCIS WILSON & MAmPHELA RAhIPHELE, UPROOTING POVERTY 43
(1989). As early as 1951, the apartheid government concluded that at least forty
percent of the population in the homelands would have to be moved to leave suffi-
cient land for those who wanted to farm full time. See id.
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the homelands has nearly tripled from 1910 to 1990.142 The
landless population ranges from between twenty percent and
thirty percent in Transkei, to thirty-six percent in Venda, to as
high fifty percent in Gazankulu.
As a result of landlessness and overcrowding, it has been
estimated that eighty percent of the residents of the home-
lands live in poverty.' Despite South Africa's ability to feed
itself, many South Africans endure hunger. The conditions
Africans endure are striking in absolute and relative terms.
The social and economic conditions Africans suffer contrasts
sharply with those of South Africa's White community.45
South Africa has one of the world's highest GINI coefficients,
which measures the economic inequality among a country's
population. 146 Africans endure higher and rising unemploy-
ment, lower wages, greater infant mortality, and shorter life
expectancies than Whites.'47
F. The Transition from Apartheid. Repeal of the Land Acts
and Ratification of a New Constitution
The transition from apartheid to a democratic society ema-
nated from decades of political struggle, the deaths of thou-
sands of people fighting for freedom and equality, and the
damaging effects of economic sanctions imposed by the world
community. On February 2, 1990, then President Frederik W.
de Klerk announced that he would lift the ban against political
organizations and release several political prisoners. On
Februrary 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela, the near-mythic figure
synonymous with the South African struggle for freedom, was
142. See PAC, supra note 2, at 7.
143. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 40.
144. See Daryl Glaser, Regional Development in South Africa: Towards an Al-
ternative?, in AFTER APARTHEID, RENEWAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 76, 80
(John Suckling & Landeg White eds., 1988). For an analysis of the conditions in
the homelands, see PLATZKY AND WALKER, supra note 5, at 93; THOMPSON, supra
note 3, at 202.
145. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 202; see also WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra
note 141, at 17.
146. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 18.
147. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 202-03.
148. See ROBERT S. JASTER ET AL., CHANGING FORTUNES: WAR, DIPLOMACY, AND
ECONOMICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 214 (1992); see also Howard Witt, S. Africa Lifts
Bans, Vows to Free Mandela, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1990, available in 1990 WL
2938396.
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released from prison after serving twenty-seven years of a life
sentence.'49
In 1990, the apartheid government began repealing the
statutes that buttressed apartheid, including the Separate
Amenities Act, which segregated public facilities such as toilets
by race. 5 ' The following year, Parliament went on to repeal
the Group Areas Act, which segregated residential areas by
race,'5' and the Population Registration Act, which classified
citizens by race.'52 In June 1991, Parliament repealed the
1913 and 1936 Land Acts. 153
The formation of a multi-racial transitional government
and the drafting of an Interim Constitution followed the unrav-
eling of the statutory regime of apartheid.' In December
1991, delegates from nearly all of South Africa's leading politi-
cal organizations attended the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa (CODESA) to begin the formation of a multi-ra-
cial government and the drafting of an Interim Constitu-
tion."'55 On April 1, 1993, representatives from twenty-six
political parties met to begin multi-party negotiations for a
new multi-racial government.'56 As a result of these concrete
steps toward full democracy, Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1993.167 Dur-
ing the next month, the governing National Party and the
African National Congress' (ANO) endorsed an Interim
149. See Witt, supra note 148; see also Allister Sparks, South Africa Frees
Mandela After 27 Years; Jubilant Crowds Dance, Shout in Black Townships, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 1990, available in 1990 WL 2149323.
150. See Discriminatory Legislation Regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act 100
of 1990, § 1; see also generally Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953
(repealed 1990).
151. See Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, ch. II,
§ 48(a); see also generally The Group Areas 36 of 1966 (Repealed 1991).
152. See Population Registration Act Repeal Act 114 of 1991, § 1(1); see also
generally Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (repealed 1991).
153. See Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, ch. I,
§§ 1(a), 11(a).
154. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and .Despair For a New South Africa: The
Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 77-79 (1997).
155. See id. at 78-79; see also Michael Holman, De Klerk Embarks on Uncertain
Trek, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at 4.
156. See Holman, supra note 155.
157. See id.
158. The African National Congress (ANC) is a political organization that has
long opposed apartheid. See Mutua, supra note 154, at 64, 89. The ANC has been
described as "South Africa's premier reformist organization during apartheid." Id.
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Constitution.159 Under the Interim Constitution, a transition-
al government was formed to govern South Africa until the
country held democratic elections. 60
The people of South Africa elected the ANC by a clear
majority in South Africa's first truly democratic election in
1994."6 Nelson Mandela was elected president by the ANC
controlled Parliament shortly thereafter.'62 Following Mr.
Mandela's election, a "Government of National Unity" was
formed by which the leading political parties-the ANC, the
National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party-shared cabi-
net posts in the new government in proportion to the number
of seats they held in the National Assembly. 3 The Interim
Constitution continued as South Africa's main governing docu-
ment until the democratically elected representatives drafted a
permanent document in 1996.'
On May 8, 1996, the South African government adopted
the final Constitution." The new Constitution, whose provi-
sions will be phased in over three years, establishes majority
rule and a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberties
similar to the governing legal documents of the leading democ-
racies of the world.'66 South Africa's Bill of Rights prohibits
discrimination based on "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and
birth."'67 The Constitutional Court, the highest court of South
Africa, has final jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of the
Constitution.6 The Constitution divided the country into
nine provinces, each of which has control over regional services.'69
at 89.
159. See Mutua, supra note 154, at 78-79.
160. See id. at 79.
161. See Laurinda Keys, 'Let Us Forget the Past' Mandela, at Election Eve
Service Urges Reconciliation, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 1994, available in 1994 WL
5972670.
162. See Holman, supra note 155.
163. See S. AFR. CONST. (Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993) c. 4, §§ 40(1),
48(1); see also Mutua, supra note 154, at 79.
164. See Mutua, supra note 154, at 83-84.
165. See id.
166. See generally S. AFR. CONST. ch 2; see also Mutua, supra note 154, at 83-
85.
167. S. AFR. CONST. ch 2, §9(3).
168. See id. ch 8, § 167.
169. These are the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, Kwazulu-Natal,
19971 483
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The political evolution of South Africa continues. On the
day following the ratification of the Constitution, the National
Party, led by Mr. de Klerk, opted out of the power sharing
arrangement of the Government of National Unity and an-
nounced its withdrawal therefrom.7 ° Mr. de Kierk expressed
his belief that true multi-party democracy requires a strong
opposition and stated that the National Party would fulfill that
role.' In May 1997, however, Mr. de Klerk resigned as the
leader of the National Party. 2 Depending on who is elected
as his successor, the National Party may seek to rejoin the
Government of National Unity. 3 How this ultimately will
play out remains to be seen.
III. RATIONALES FOR RuRAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION
A. The Validity of Rural Land Redistribution in South Africa
Land is an appropriate means of compensating Africans
for the harms they suffered under apartheid and expanding
Black economic self-sufficiency and political empowerment.
Because the past cannot be undone and the injuries cannot be
fully quantified, Africans will never be compensated fully for
the hardship unleashed on them over generations by the White
minority-ruled government. A return to their land, however, is
among the best compensation they can hope to receive.
Land is appropriate compensation to Africans because,
first and foremost, it is their country and their land. Land
redistribution redresses current and historically recent harms.
The dispossession following the enactment of the 1913 and
1936 Acts occurred in historically recent times. Many of the
Africans who endured forced removals and related atrocities
are alive and able to recount their experiences.'
Africans should be compensated with land because their
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, North West, and Western Cape.
See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 6, § 103(1).
170. See Holnan, supra note 155.
171. See id.
172. See Roger Matthews, Successor to de Kierk May Rejoin Government, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11050118.
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., MALLABY, supra note 98, at 142 (documenting the 1954 removal
of the Nyambi family); see generally KEEGAN, supra note 68, at 3-109 (documenting
the lives of several families following forced removals).
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dispossession is the source of their oppression. Land redistribu-
tion begins to adjust for the historical inequities caused by the
White minority-ruled government's dispossession of Africans'
property and its manipulation of property rights, which barred
Africans from accumulating wealth.
Monetary compensation is a limited means of redress. It is
neither a place to build shelter nor a place to produce food.
Monetary compensation only represents income while compen-
sation with land represents wealth, equity, and a source of
control and power. Redistributing rural land will empower
Africans by giving them control over a source of capital and,
therefore, more control over their lives. The unique value of
property lies in its conceptual essence. As one scholar has
noted, "the conceptual essence of property is the power given to
a single individual or group (called the "owner") to control the
allocation of some resource whose employment may affect the
well-being of the larger community."75
Property ownership also generates political clout. The
National Party, for example, subsidized poor White farmers for
decades in exchange for their political loyalty.'76 Although it
is unlikely that African farmers in post-apartheid South Africa
will wield the influence of White farmers under apartheid,
African farmers can achieve a degree of political power as
property owners with common interests. Further, property
owners have political clout because they manage a "resource
whose employment may affect the well-being of the larger
community."
177
B. The Constitutional Authority for Rural Land
Redistribution
The Constitution expressly manifests the moral, social,
and economic bases for rural land redistribution by providing
the legal authority empowering the government to redistribute
land. The Constitution also articulates the mechanisms by
which to implement land redistribution-government expropri-
175. Eben Moglen, Takings and Redistribution: North American Fifth Amend-
ment Theory in South African Circumstances 2 (Sept. 26, 1989) (unpublished pa-
per, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
176. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 148.
177. Moglen, supra note 175, at 2.
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ation and legislative action.
The Constitution's Bill of Rights addresses property rights.
The Constitution first states that "[nlo one may be deprived of
property except in terms of law of general application, and no
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property."' Not-
withstanding this basic premise, the Constitution permits
government expropriation of private property: "[piroperty may
be expropriated only in terms of law of general application...
(a) for public purposes or in the public interest; and (b) subject
to compensation, the amount, timing, and manner of payment,
of which must be agreed, or decided or approved by a
court." The definition of public interest "includes the
nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring
about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resourc-
es."' Regarding compensation, its "amount, timing, and
manner of payment" must "be just and equitable, reflecting an
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests
of those affected." 8'
178. S. AFR. CoNST. ch. 2, § 25(1).
179. Id. ch. 2, § 25(2).
180. Id. ch 2, § 25(4)(a). Land reform is not unprecedented as being within the
public interest for purposes of justifying government expropriation of property, at
least under the constitutional jurisprudence of nations other than South Africa. In
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984), the United States Su-
preme Court held that a state government's exercise of its eminent domain powers
to implement a fully-compensated land redistribution plan was constitutional be-
cause it was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose. An estimated 47%
of the land in Hawaii was owned by only 72 landowners as a result of the histori-
cal concentration of land ownership by tribal chiefs and colonial owners. See id. at
232. Since 49% of the land in Hawaii was owned by the federal government, this
meant that nearly all of the privately owned land in the state was concentrated in
the hands of only a few individuals. See id. The state government, exercising its
power of eminent domain, created a system where residential tracts of land were
condemned and compensation was paid to the owners. See id. at 233. Once a tract
of land was condemned, individuals who were leasing that land were given the
opportunity to purchase it and could borrow up to 90% of the purchase price from
the state in order to do so. See id at 234. The Court upheld this system of land
reform, stating that: "Ithe Hawaii legislature enacted its Land Reform Act not to
benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals but to attack certain perceived
evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii-a legitimate public purpose.
Use of condemnation to achieve this purpose is not irrational." Id. at 245 (empha-
sis added). This holding could provide guidance for a South African court, which
may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. S. AFR. CONST. ch.
2, § 39(1)(c).
181. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 25(3). A court applying this balancing test must
consider "all relevant factors, including . . . (a) the current use of the property; (b)
the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the
486
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The Constitution also provides for legislative action to
implement land reform. Under Section 25(7), "[a] person or
community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is enti-
tled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
restitution of that property, or to equitable redress."'82 Sec-
tion 25(6) supplements this principle by providing that "[a]
person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either
to tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable re-
dress."" These provisions explicitly recognize the social in-
justices Africans have endured under apartheid. The first pro-
vision acknowledges the land dispossession that occurred in
the aftermath of the 1913 Act." The second provision recog-
nizes the insecurity of land tenure following the 1913 Act and
forced removals."
By acknowledging the adverse social conditions caused by
land dispossession, the Constitution not only authorizes legis-
lative action, it manifests the expectation of the South African
people that Parliament will take legislative action. This intent
is further reflected in Section 25(5), which provides that "[t]he
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis."' Fur-
thermore, Section 25(8) states that "[n]o provision of this sec-
tion may impede the state from taking legislative and other
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to
redress the results of past racial discrimination." 8 ' These
provisions unambiguously contemplate proactive steps by the
legislature and other governmental bodies to implement land
reform and address the harms that emanated from land dis-
possession.
property, (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the
expropriation." Id.
182. Id. ch. 2, § 25(7).
183. Id. ch. 2, § 25(6).
184. See id. ch. 2, § 25(7).
185. See id. ch. 2, § 25(6).
186. Id. ch. 2, § 25(5).
187. Id. ch. 2, § 25(8).
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The Bill of Rights also declares that "[elveryone has the
right to have access to adequate housing," and that "[tihe state
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
this right."" Comprehensive rural land redistribution con-
templates addressing the social and economic conditions of
Africans. Housing is among those needs and the Constitution
authorizes state action to address it.'89
Finally, the Constitution offers this guiding principle for
interpreting the Bill of Rights: "[wihen interpreting the Bill of
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum... must promote the values
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom.""s This provision, in conjunc-
tion with the sections discussed above, makes clear that the
post-apartheid government has the constitutional authority
necessary to initiate and implement a comprehensive land
redistribution program.
C. Specific Rationales Justifying Rural Land Redistribution
1. Africans Demand Land Redistribution
Among the most persuasive rationales for rural land redis-
tribution is the simple fact that a critical mass of Africans
demand and expect land redistribution. It is delusional to ex-
pect Africans, who have been systematically oppressed and
denied fundamental civil rights under apartheid, not to seek
land to which they have legitimate claims. This is particularly
true of African property owners who were dispossessed of their
land and the impoverished, militant Blacks who were in the
forefront of the democratic struggle. For them, land redistribu-
tion is a political inevitability.
Africans demand land redistribution because they recog-
nize that the present distribution of land is illegitimate. The
present allocation of land emanated from conquest exacerbated
by the repeated suppression of Africans' property rights
through a process in which they could not participate. The
inequities in land allocation have not been caused by purely
economic forces but by deliberate political machinations. Ac-
188. Id. ch. 2, § 26(1)-(2).
189. See id.
190. Id. ch. 2, § 39(1)(a).
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cordingly, Africans realize that the unfettered market cannot
adequately address the current disparities in land allocation.
Africans perceive the nexus between the creation of apart-
heid and their dispossession of property and property rights.
Although a great deal of land dispossession had already oc-
curred by the turn of the twentieth century, the 1913 and 1936
Land Acts and the formal implementation of apartheid manip-
ulated the distribution of property further by undermining the
neutral marketplace. As a direct result, Africans were preclud-
ed from reversing the effects of colonial conquest, freely buying
and selling land, and acquiring economic self-sufficiency. Land
redistribution, therefore, does not destroy but vindicates prop-
erty rights.
Africans also demand land based on their cultural claims
to the land. For many Africans, access to land is considered to
be a birthright.' Land is the site of family, history, and
gravesites; it is not simply a commercial asset. As one author
notes, "[the land represents the link between the past and the
future; ancestors lie buried there, children will be born there.
Farming is more than just a-productive activity, it is an act of
culture, the centre of social existence, and the place where
personal identity is forged."' 9 Moreover, unlike some dispos-
sessed peoples who have been pushed off of their land entirely,
many Africans remain connected to the land.' 93 A consider-
able number of Africans have not lost their farming skills as
most rural land is farmed by Africans. 94
In addition to the moral imperative to respond affirmative-
ly to these claims, the democratically elected government may
confront a political powderkeg and its inevitable explosion if it
ignores these demands. Many Africans are bitter and angry:
[Bilacks are so good at hiding their own suffering that whites
could easily forget it ever happened. At the start of South
Africa's transition, whites declared that after apartheid there
should be a fresh start for everyone, glibly discounting the
past.
This was truer about land than about any other issue,
191. See SACHS, supra note 2, at 115; see also PAC, supra note 2, at 13.
192. SACHS, supra note 2, at 115.
193. See id. at 132.
194. See PAC, supra note 2, at 16.
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partly because dispossession of black farmers was the biggest
hardship inflicted by apartheid and partly because healing it
seemed impossibly difficult.' 5
As long as these feelings are pervasive, there will be Africans
who will not tolerate the current allocation of land. The post-
apartheid government may be compelled to redistribute land to
avert civil unrest.' Land distribution may be a necessary
showing of good faith in building a new and just South Africa.
2. Land Should Be Redistributed to Enable Blacks to Improve
Their Economic and Social Condition
Land redistribution is necessary to create the just and
united South Africa envisioned by the Constitution. How can
the "divisions of the past" be healed and "a society based on
democratic values" and "social justice" be built if the extreme
social and economic inequities created by apartheid are not
meaningfully addressed?97 Land redistribution is a means of
"improv[ing] the quality of life of all [South African] citizens
and free[ing] the potential of each person" and allowing Black
South Africans to realize the political rights they have recently
obtained in a meaningful way.9 The Constitution, which ex-
pressly recognizes the injustices of apartheid and embodies
abstract political rights (e.g., due process)'99 with concrete so-
cial rights (e.g., housing),"9 reflects the idea that a socially
just democracy embodies more than the right to vote. It recog-
nizes that basic social and economic needs must be met to
enable the citizenry to exercise and benefit fully from political
rights.
Redistributing land to Africans will also integrate Africans
into the mainstream economy and give them a stake in South
Africa's future:
[Piroperty and the legal institutions that protect it retain a
195. MALLABY, supra note 98, at 141.
196. Political violence has claimed over 14,000 lives between 1991 and 1994.
See Mkhonto Mkhondo, Serious Problems Await Post-Apartheid South Africa,
EMERGE, April 1994, at 19.
197. S. AFR. CONST. preamble.
198. Id.
199. See id. ch. 2, § 33.
200. See id. ch. 2, § 26.
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valuable secondary function; they... creat[e] a basis on
which future stability can be erected, conveying a stake in
the outcome to those individuals who might otherwise abdi-
cate political responsibility or abandon the fundamental
premise of politics-the need to live with others, including
dissident others, in a single community.'
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a communi-
ty where the degree of economic inequality is as great as it is
in South Africa.0 2 If the present extreme inequities remain,
Africans will have little incentive to work for higher productivi-
ty.3 Redistributing land and putting Africans in a position
where they can begin to be self-sufficient and bargain equally
with Whites is a necessary condition for creating a unified
South Africa and improving race relations. Although other
forms of restitution may ease poverty, they would probably do
little to change inequality between the races and the structure
of power relations.2 4 Land redistribution is vital not solely
from an economic standpoint but from a political and psycho-
logical perspective. Control over land will transform Africans
and the manner in which they perceive themselves and others
perceive them.
Some scholars believe that the development of comprehen-
sive strategies to address poverty in South Africa is the
country's fundamental challenge.2 ' Given the extreme pover-
ty of rural Africans, land redistribution, combined with broader
economic and agricultural reforms, can only improve their
economic status. 6 One reform that would supplement land
redistribution and help to improve economic condition of Afri-
cans would be the integration of the rural economy into the
201. See MOGLEN, supra note 175, at 14.
202. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 4.
203. See RussELL KING, LAND REFoRMI 7 (1977).
204. See Terence Moll, 'The Limits of the Possible'. Macro-economic Policy and
Income Redistribution in Latin America and South Africa, in AFTER APARTHEID,
supra note 144, at 19, 30.
205. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 4.
206. See KING, supra note 203, at 71-72 (noting that "[glenerally the historical
approach shows that land reform can make a vital contribution to, [even though
it] is by no means an automatic condition of, economic development" and suggest-
ing that obstacles related to-but beyond the scope of-land reform "can be sur-
mounted only by the diversification of the economy as a whole in the course of a
programme of general economic development").
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urban economy."0 7 To achieve this, the post-apartheid govern-
ment will have to build infrastructure (water, sanitation,
roads, electricity, telecommunications, housing) to connect
urban and rural areas. Also it will have to facilitate the rural
population's engagement in the commercial production of agri-
culture and help rural dwellers to compete with goods and
services that are produced in the urban areas and sold in the
rural communities.0"
Land redistribution is more likely to succeed if sufficient
institutional support and infrastructure are provided °.2 " For
example, in Zimbabwe, the government raised corn prices after
achieving independence in the 1980s, which encouraged farm-
ers to increase production.210 The government further sup-
ported African farmers by providing transportation and cred-
it.2 ' These strategies significantly increased the production
of Black farmers.1 In 1980, Black farmers produced seven
percent of the country's marketed corn.213 By 1985, their
share of production rose to two-thirds of the market.1 4
Comprehensive land reform, of which land redistribution is
an element, must take into account the need to increase the
long-term productive use of land1 5 and advance social and
economic goals in the country's national interests (e.g., reform
should not disrupt the country's food exports). In the long run,
such policies will stimulate capital investment in South Africa.
Redistributing rural land will give Africans opportunities
beyond economic dependence on Whites.216 Africans will be
able to exercise economic self-determination by controlling
207. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 287.
208. See id. at 287-88.
209. See KING, supra note 203, at 71-72.
210. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 154.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. It should be noted that although land policy in Zimbabwe has
increased the output of Black farmers for certain crops, land policy has not result-
ed in political or economic power for Blacks. While Whites comprise only one per-
cent of Zimbabwe's population, they dominate the country's farms and economy.
See Bill Keller, Zimbabwe Whites Find the Good Life is in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1993, at AS.
215. Erosion of agricultural areas is a significant problem here. The Develop-
ment Bank of South Africa has reported that 25% of White farming areas suffer
from erosiun. See South Africa Grapples With Land Issue, supra note 58, at 2.
216. See Skweyiya, supra note 7, at 220.
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capital if provided the necessary supports for commercial prod-
uction. Under apartheid, Africans' role in the economy was
that of a mere factor of production. Access to land will change
their economic status to owners of capital. Redistributing land
will reduce the degree of political and economic inequality
between Whites and Africans. Success among Black farmers is
possible because the desire and willingness to succeed is
great.217
Rural land redistribution and comprehensive economic and
agricultural reforms will create jobs and self-employment op-
portunities in the rural areas.218 This is of critical importance
in South Africa because the urban economy cannot absorb all
of the unemployment in the homelands. 29 Land redistribu-
tion can help to absorb the labor force in the homelands into
agricultural jobs by dividing large farms into smaller ones.
This strategy not only increases rural employment, it increases
productivity as only limited economies of scale are achieved by
farms larger than 300-400 hectares (750-1,000 acres).220
Small holdings generally are more productive than large ones
because greater investments of household labor and the effi-
ciency advantages of that labor over wage labor appear to more
than compensate for potential economies of scale that in prac-
tice are usually unrealizedY
Land redistribution will begin to address homelessness
and hunger within the Black population. By some accounts,
roughly seven million Africans are homeless.2' Land that
217. See, e.g., Bill Keller, A Farmer, but Not Exactly a Boer. You See . . . ,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at A4 (describing the aspirations of an African farmer
recently in receipt of land).
218. See Helena Dolny & Heinz Mug, Land Reform: Legal Support and Eco-
nomic Regulation, in SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW 6, at 322 (Glenn Moss and Ingrid
Obery eds., 1992).
219. See David Cooper, Ownership and Control of Agriculture in South Africa,
in AFTER APARTHIED, supra note 144, at 47; see also generally C.M. Rogerson, Late
Apartheid and the Urban Informal Sector, in AFTER APARTHEID, supra note 146, at
144, 132-45 (analyzing the weaknesses of the urban economy in South Africa).
220. See WISON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 311; see also John Bruce,
The Variety of Reform: A Review of Recent Experience with Land Reform and the
Reform of Land Tenure, with Particular Reference to the African Experience 3
(Sept. 1989) (unpublished paper, on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law); KING, supra note 203, at 58.
221. See Bruce, supra note 220, at 3.
222. See Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse Into
South Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 472
1997] 493
BROOK. J. INTL L.
cannot be farmed can be redistributed to the homeless popula-
tion and used for housing.' Land redistribution also can ad-
dress the hunger crisis by encouraging subsistence farming.
Land should be redistributed such that beneficiaries receive no
less than the minimum amount of land necessary to achieve
self-sufficiency."
Improving the economic conditions of Africans will improve
the entire country's economy by increasing internal demand for
goods and services. The economy needs increased demand from
Africans because they comprise the majority of the population
and the wealth of the remaining population is insufficient to
expand economic growth. Economic demand from Africans is
limited because of their poverty.' If the per capita income of
the poor rises even slightly, this can significantly improve
internal demand." 8 The extensive poverty of such a large
proportion of the population causes the economy to have a
structure that discourages the production of the goods that are
needed most. 7
Redistribution must be executed in a manner that also
gives women access to direct control of land. If these safe-
guards are not implemented, redistribution could create a
landless class of women. In Kenya, for example, the country
converted the tenure of most farmland to private individual
ownership following independence.22 However, private own-
ership was vested in men, which enabled them to sell their
property out from under their families and leave women land-
less."9
The democratically elected government should also consid-
er the capacity for persons who are being considered as poten-
tial beneficiaries of land redistribution in rural areas to be
successful farmers." Africans with limited agricultural skills
should receive less land and be encouraged to engage in coop-
(1996).
223. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 26(1)-(2).
224. It has been suggested that 15 hectares (approximately 37.5 acres) per
household is the minimum amount of land necessary to achieve self-sufficiency. See
PAC, supra note 2, at 14.
225. See Glaser, supra note 144, at 80.
226. See KING, supra note 203, at 67.
227. See id. at 52.
228. See Bruce, supra note 220, at 18.
229. See id.
230. See PAC, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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erative farming. Those with more skills should receive more
land.
The standard to judge the wisdom of land redistribution
should be whether Africans would be better off with no change.
The fact that this cannot be answered affirmatively bolsters
the wisdom of implementing reform. Africans must be absorbed
into the economic system so that they can afford to exercise
their newly acquired rights. The right to buy property and to
live anywhere in South Africa is meaningless without the eco-
nomic wherewithal to do so.
3. Land Should Be Redistributed to Redress Harms Caused
by the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and by the Forced Removals
Instituted Under the Policy of Separate Development.
The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, as explored earlier, devas-
tated Africans."' To redress these harms, land should be re-
distributed to former Black landowners. Rural Blacks who en-
dured the hardships of the migrant labor system and exploita-
tion by White farmers should have reasonable opportunities to
obtain land because these individuals are bound to demand,
and are entitled to, such compensation as a matter of basic
justice.
Under the same rationale, rural land should be redistrib-
uted to the African landowners who were dispossessed of their
property by the government's policy of forced removals. 2
Non-property owners who endured the destruction of their
communities and the profound disruptions in their lives from
forced removals should be given access to land for similar rea-
sons. 23 3
IV. IMPLEMENTING COMPREHENSIVE RURAL LAND
REDISTRIBUTION
The Constitution permits government expropriation of
property "in the public interest" and "subject to compensa-
tion."' Arguably, all of the rationales for rural land redistri-
bution explored herein are within the public interest, either
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. See supra Part II.E.
233. See supra Part II.E.
234. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 25(2)(a)-(b).
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explicitly or implicitly.
The Constitution gives South African courts broad discre-
tion in determining compensation. 5 Courts do not simply
determine the amount of compensation; they also determine
the timing and manner of payment. 6 All three of these as-
pects of compensation must be "just and equitable, reflecting
an equitable balance between the public interest and the inter-
ests of those affected." 7 In balancing these interests, courts
must consider the property's: (i) current use; (ii) history of
acquisition and use; (iii) market value; (iv) the extent of direct
state subsidy in the property; and (v) the purpose of the
property's expropriation."8
The Constitution does not state in whose favor any partic-
ular factor should weigh. These factors, therefore, will be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis and the party in whose favor a
particular factor weighs will vary from one case to the next.
Also the balance between the "public interest" and "the inter-
ests of those affected" is an equitable one, rather than an equal
one, which gives the court additional flexibility in determining
compensation. 9 Accordingly, some factors will be given more
weight than others, depending on the particular facts.
Given the broad discretion of courts to determine compen-
sation, the government can expropriate property and satisfy
the constitutional standard for just and equitable compensa-
tion by paying moderate, or even nominal, compensation and
by making such payments over a lengthy period of time which
would decrease the expense of large scale government expro-
priations. Such outcomes are likely in cases where the property
has been acquired below market values following the 1913 Act
and has had substantial direct government subsidy and where
the purpose of the expropriation is to give restitution to vic-
tims of apartheid with claims to particular plots of land. Mod-
erate or nominal compensation would manifest a reasonable
compromise between those who believe property owners should
receive no compensation and those who believe property own-
ers should receive full market value.'4 Limited compensation
235. See id. ch. 2, § 25(3).
236. See id.
237. I&
238. See id. ch. 2, § 25(3)(a)-(e).
239. Id. ch. 2, § 25(3).
240. Scholars and organizations advocating for land reform have expressed
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is more palatable to Africans who are seeking a return to the
land and who believe property owners have already been en-
riched unjustly. White property owners will find a government
expropriation of property less egregious if they receive some
compensation.
With regard to comprehensive land reform under legisla-
tive or other governmental action, the proposals for land redis-
tribution should be guided by a set of clearly defined goals that
the policy is designed to achieve. In order to be successful, land
reform must be tailored to South Africa's unique cultural heri-
tage and economic and political conditions. 4 The goals,
structure, and implementation of land redistribution should be
identified and formulated through locally-based democratic
structures. 2 Such procedures should be consistent, should be
fair, and should comport with the values, rights, and interests
that the South African people have articulated in their Consti-
tution or elsewhere. It is undesirable for these reforms to be
implemented in a manner that replicates the procedures of
apartheid (e.g., government action under administrative de-
cree). Proposals should be analyzed thoroughly to discern the
proposed beneficiaries of those reforms and be subject to scruti-
ny by the people affected by them.2" The officials who imple-
ment land reform should be held accountable to the people.2'
Although locally-based decision making is the ideal para-
digm, such a process is impeded by the significant level of
illiteracy and the lack of familiarity with democratic processes
among the Black population. Despite these barriers, locally-
based decision making should be pursued in the name of de-
mocracy and fairness. Encouraging Black participation in the
political process will require outreach and education. Given the
differing views on the compensation issue. See, e.g., Dolny & Mug, supra note 218,
at 329 (unrecovered investment or loss of future profits); ANC, supra note 2, at 29
(balance must be struck between necessity for compensation and the need to com-
pensate historically disenfranchised Black South Africans); PAC, supra note 2, at
13 (compensation on the improvements only); KING, supra note 203, at 67 (stating
generally that compensation can be in the form of government bonds to force prop-
erty owners to invest in government-owned or sponsored industry or infrastruc-
ture).
241. Cf KING, supra note 203, at 4.
242. See ANC, supra note 2, at 29; see also DOLNY & KLUG, supra note 218, at
322.
243. See WILSON & RAMPHELE, supra note 141, at 313.
244. See id. at 314.
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highly technical nature of land use decision making, it is nei-
ther anticipated nor desired that the general population make
land use decisions directly. Democracy, however, requires that
the general population have an opportunity to elect local repre-
sentatives who will make decisions on their behalf and be held
accountable to them. In order to implement the goals of land
redistribution, the post-apartheid government must identify
the beneficiaries of reform.
Pursuant to comprehensive land reform, the post-apart-
heid government must establish forms of tenure. The demo-
cratically elected government confronts the tension between its
desire to make direct access to land to a significant portion of
the Black rural population a realizable goal and its desire to
encourage investment and productive land use through private
and secure forms of tenure. Decisionmakers should strive to
advance both of these objectives and therefore embrace differ-
ent systems of tenure. Furthermore, the forms of tenure chosen
are consequential from a production standpoint. Although
tenure is not the most pivotal factor in production, secure
forms of tenure combined with assistance can enable farmers
to generate greater productivity and welfare."4
There is controversy between those who endorse commu-
nal tenure and those who advocate individual ownership. Some
believe that land should be held communally to prevent White
farmers from buying Blacks' land, and leaving them landless,
and to limit the widening of the economic gap between rural
Blacks and Whites."45 The most tenable options appear to be
private freehold tenure, limited communal tenure, and limited
nationalization. Given the country's capitalist, private enter-
prise economy, tenure probably will evolve toward private
individual ownership to comport with the economic system.2 7
In addition to traditional, private individual ownership,
other tenure options include leaseholds from community land
trusts (CLTs).' Under a CLT, a private, non-profit corpora-
245. See generally John J. Carroll, Agrarian Reform, Productivity and Equity:
Two Studies, in SECOND VIEW FROM THE PADDY 15, 16-17, 19 (Ledesma et al. eds.
1983).
246. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 149-50 (discussing the concerns of Aninka
Claasens and Zola Skweyiya, both of whom are members of the ANC).
247. See Bruce, supra note 220, at 17.
248. THE INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMICS, THE COMUNITY LAND TRUST
LEGAL MANUAL 1-7 (1991) [hereinafter CLT MANUAL].
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tion acquires and holds land for the benefit of a community
and provides affordable access to land and housing for commu-
nity residents. 9 Generally, the CLT is managed by a board
of directors comprising current and future lessees and commu-
nity people, who live adjacent to, but not in, the CLT."° By
limiting the tenant's ability to benefit from the entire appreci-
ated value of her plot or house when she sells, the CLT keeps
the land affordable for subsequent tenants.251 CLTs can meet
the needs of communities unable to participate in the market
through other channels. This form of tenure is a satisfactory
medium between communal tenure and traditional private
ownership. Like communal tenure, it increases the accessibility
of poor people to the land and emphasizes the values of cooper-
ation and mutual assistance. Unlike full-scale nationalization
and cooperatives, it is voluntary, not coercive.
Communal tenure, where every citizen of a group has
access to the land of that group as a birthright, is a less viable
form of tenure.1 2 First, unlike during pre-colonial periods,
land is scarce." Second, communal tenure discourages con-
servation and improvement because farmers do not benefit
from the increased value of the land.' Third, financing pro-
duction is difficult because banks generally are unwilling to
extend credit on property on which they cannot obtain a lien.
Fourth, communal tenure is vulnerable to nepotism. 5 Final-
ly, it is not clear that the majority of Africans want to return
to communal tenure. They may feel similar to Tanzanians
following independence in their country in the 1960s and may
reject any form of cooperative farming." Following indepen-
249. See id. at 1-7, 1-10.
250. See id. at 1-7.
251. See id. at 1-9.
252. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 137.
253. See id.
254. See KING, supra note 203, at 358-59. CLTs resemble traditional forms of
communal tenure because they are a form of tenure that increases access to land
to more people and land is managed for the benefit of a group. Compare CLT
MANUAL, supra note 248, at 1-10, with KING, supra note 203, at 356-57. However,
CLTs mitigate the risk of members using the land unproductively by permitting
individuals to benefit from some of the increased value of the land. See CLT MAN-
UAL, supra note 248, at 1-10.
255. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 141; see also PAC, supra note 2, at 19.
256. See JOHN P. POWELSON & RICHARD STOCK, THE PEASANT BETRAYED 49-51,
58 (1987).
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dence in 1961, Tanzania's President Nyerere effectively abol-
ished private ownership and implemented Ujamaa, or African
socialism, to prevent greater socioeconomic inequity among
rural people. 7 The government consolidated villages with
land to be farmed collectively, which made it easier for the
State to provide technical assistance and other services. 8
The people rejected Ujamaa despite the underlying theory that
it conformed to African values of cooperation and mutual assis-
tance. 9 By 1973, only fifteen percent of land had been collec-
tivized, and much of this occurred by coercion."6 The results
undermined the notion that African socialism inhered natural-
ly in African peasants.
Tanzania's failed attempt at land reform should inform the
approach taken by South Africa. The experiences in Tanzania
specifically, and the detriments of communal tenure in general,
suggest that communal tenure presents unique risks. These
experiences and detriments do not, however, necessarily imply
that communal tenure should be rejected out of hand. Commu-
nal tenure may be a reasonable option in communities such as
Transkei where land currently is used in that manner.2"' At
least one scholar has suggested that factors unique to Tanza-
nia may account for the failures of Ujamaa.26 These factors
include the poor administration of the program, the poor re-
turns to labor in the collective farms, the difficulties of organiz-
ing communal work among ethnically diverse people, and the
lack of clear land tenure arrangements for land farmed indi-
vidually and communally.2
A third option is the nationalization of some land. It has
been argued that "[wihere beneficiaries of redistribution pro-
grams are provided with security of tenure, both freeholds and
long-term leaseholds from the state can be viable options.""
Kenya, which has utilized freeholds, and Zambia, which has
257. See id at 50, 52-53; see also JULIUS K. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM
2 (1968).
258. See POWELSON & STOCK, supra note 256, at 54-55, 57.
259. See id. at 54, 58.
260. See id. at 54-55, 57.
261. Interview with Enoch M. Gqomo, Regional Treasurer, African National
Congress, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 15, 1993).
262. See Bruce, supra note 220, at 5.
263. See id
264. Id. at 24.
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opted for long-term leaseholds, have had satisfactory experi-
ences with this approach in terms of production.2" If the
state leases land to citizens, the security of tenure depends on
the terms of the lease and the effectiveness of the land admin-
istration process."' In Somalia, for example, land reform has
been less successful than in Zambia.267 The leasehold system
in Somalia was poorly structured and failed to protect lessees
from a land-grabbing bureaucracy."
Full scale nationalization and subsequent redistribution
appear untenable as White farmers and local banks will vehe-
mently oppose such a policy. The international community, a
primary source of investment capital, will be similarly opposed.
This tactic also would disrupt agricultural production for local
and export use and discourage foreign investment.
Last, but certainly not least, the post-apartheid govern-
ment must identify the land available for comprehensive land
reform. The post-apartheid government could make available
for land redistribution indebted farmland, underutilized or
wastefully used land, land acquired through nepotism or cor-
ruption, and land held for speculation.26 To make additional
land available for redistribution, the democratically elected
government could limit land ownership by size and by number
of holdings, 270 and implement a progressive tax scheme to en-
courage large landowners to dispose some of their holdings.2 '
Although virtually all farmland is indebted, the democrati-
cally elected government could define the criteria for determin-
ing when land is hopelessly indebted and take possession of
those properties. In 1991, the Development Bank of Southern
Africa, which studies land issues for the government, deter-
mined that 3,000 White farmers were hopelessly indebted. 72
These farms comprised approximately ten million acres. In
addition the democratically elected government also may dis-
tribute the land that it holds in trust.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See ANC, supra note 2, at 27.
270. See PAC, supra note 2, at 12.
271. See generally ANC, supra note 2, at 27.
272. See MALLABY, supra note 98, at 148-49.
273. See id. at 149.
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V. ADJUDICATING INDWIIDUAL CLAIMS TO LAND
There are several issues with respect to adjudicating indi-
vidual claims to land. The first issue is the type of system that
would be established to hear such claims. Numerous scholars
and organizations have endorsed establishing a system of land
claims courts.274 This suggestion took fruition, at least to
some extent, with the swearing-in of South Africa's Land
Claims Court on March 29, 1996.275 The Land Claims Court
takes claims from the Commission on the Restitution of Land
Rights, which mediates land claims arising from the forced
removals after the enactment of the 1913 Act.275 If mediation
fails, claims are referred to the Land Claims Court for adjudi-
cation.277 The Land Claims Court can order restitution to
successful claimants in the form of land or other remedies, for
which the state bears the burden of compensation.278 Both
the Land Claims Court and the Commission on the Restitution
of Land Rights were formed under the Restitution of Land
Rights Act of 1994.279
As one commentator recently has noted, "[i]t is too early to
gauge the success of [this] restitution scheme, although a
handful of claims have been settled."' ° It has been estimat-
ed, however, that the current Land Claims Court system will
only affect approximately two percent of the land in South
Africa."' With respect to the small percentage of claims that
the Land Claims Court system does cover, a major difficulty
that is likely to surface will be the inability of claimants to
substantiate their claims. In most cases, South Africans will
not have documentation to support claims that their land was
dispossessed in the furtherance of a specific discriminatory
law, either because they never had such records or because the
274. See, e.g., ANC, supra note 2, at 29; SACHS, supra note 2, at 130; Dolny &
Mug, supra note 218, at 327. Other countries, such as Canada and Australia,
have implemented land courts to address land reform issues.
275. See Mutua, supra note 154, at 94 n.187.
276. See id. at 94.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. For a detailed discussion of
this statute, see 1994 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 12-20 (1995)
[hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL SURVEY].
280. Id.
281. See id.
502 [Vol. MXIII:2
RURAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION
records were destroyed along with other personal effects dur-
ing forced removals." 2 Therefore, courts will have to rely on
oral testimony." The Land Claims Court system is further
limited by the requirement that claims must be brought within
a period of approximately three years after the commencement
of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994.' This is a rel-
atively short period of time in light of the many years during
which Black South Africans were dispossessed of their land by
the White minority government.
Given the limited scope of the Land Claims Court, as well
as the inherent difficulties in substantiating claims, South
Africa's current land claims court system can only function as
a supplement to a government program of comprehensive land
reform. The beneficiaries of such a system would be a broader
segment of the population, based on the other rationales ex-
pressed herein or on other more flexible criteria (e.g., need).
VI. CONCLUSION
Redistributing rural land to Black South Africans is a
valid form of reparations to redress the profound and extensive
social and economic harm they have endured under apartheid.
It is also a necessary element in the creation of the just and
united South Africa envisioned by the Constitution and in the
integration of Black South Africans in the political and eco-
nomic mainstream of South Africa. The challenges to imple-
menting comprehensive land reform are formidable-expense,
time and White political opposition among them. However,
these obstacles are not sufficiently great to forego comprehen-
sive land reform entirely. This first democratically elected,
post-apartheid government faces other significant challenges in
addition to those relating to the land. Despite the daunting
tasks which this new government faces, land issues must be
addressed. Accordingly, it is expected that this government will
282. See 1994 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 279, at 13-14. The Land Claims
Court system only permits restitution to persons who were dispossessed of their
land in furtherance of a discriminatory law. See id. at 13.
283. While it should be noted that the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994
provides for flexible evidentiary rules to deal with this problem, the Land Claims
Court ultimately decides how much weight such evidence is given. See id. at 16.
This promises to be a difficult task at best.
284. See id. at 14.
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not immediately address comprehensive land reform, but do so
within a reasonable period of time. Given the progressive na-
ture of this government, a Constitution which unambiguously
authorizes comprehensive land reform and the afterglow of the
emergence from the apartheid era, the ultimate barrier to
comprehensive land reform will be the lack of political will.
Hopefully, this government will embrace land reform and seize
the opportunity to create a just and united South Africa and
emerge as a model for the world.
